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We provide evidence on the fit of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve for selected euro 
zone countries, the US and the UK. Instead of imposing rational expectations and estimating 
the Phillips curve by the Generalized Method of Moments, we follow Roberts (1997) and 
Adam and Padula (2003) and use direct measures of inflation expectations. The data source is 
the Ifo World Economic Survey, which quarterly polls economic experts about their expected 
future development of inflation. Our main findings are as follows: (i) In comparison with the 
rational expectations approach, backward-looking behaviour turns out to more relevant for 
most countries in our sample. (ii) The use of survey data for inflation expectations yields a 
positive slope of the Phillips curve when the output gap is used as a measure for marginal 
cost. 
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suggestions. 1 Introduction
The relationship between in°ation and real variables is of crucial impor-
tance for understanding the e®ects of monetary policy on in°ation. In recent
years, some kind of consensus has emerged, generally referred to as New
Keynesian macroeconomics, that integrates Keynesian elements (imperfect
competition, nominal rigidities) into a dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work traditionally used in the Real Business Cycle literature. The nature
of in°ation dynamics is arguably the most distinctive feature of the New
Keynesian paradigm. It is captured by the so-called New Keynesian Phillips
curve which is based on Calvo's (1983) model of staggered price setting and
which expresses current in°ation as a function of expected future in°ation
and a measure of ¯rms' real marginal costs. While theoretically appealing,
a number of authors (e.g. Fuhrer and Moore, 1995) criticized this version
of the Phillips curve since the implied `jump' behavior of in°ation was com-
pletely at odds with the hump-shaped behavior that can be observed in
VAR analyses. As a consequence, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) extended Calvo's
theoretical framework to the so-called hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve
(HNKPC) by allowing for a fraction of ¯rms that set prices according to a
backward-looking rule-of-thumb.
The empirical ¯ndings are encouraging for the New Keynesian Phillips
curve. Empirical work mainly centers around the question of which variable
to use for measuring real activity and whether backward-looking behavior
is relevant. Concerning the ¯rst question, theory tells us that real marginal
costs are the driving force underlying changes in in°ation. In a recent survey
article Gal¶ ³ (2003) emphasizes that empirical results are promising when the
New Keynesian Phillips curve is estimated in a way consistent with theory,
implying that labor income share is used instead of detrended GDP as a
proxy for real marginal costs. Concerning the second question he continues:
\Although backward-looking behavior is often statistically signi¯cant, it ap-
pears to have limited quantitative importance. In other words, although the
baseline pure forward-looking model is rejected on statistical grounds, it is
still likely to be a reasonable ¯rst approximation to the in°ation dynamics
of both Europe and the United States." (ibid., p. 162).
The standard econometric tool for estimating the New Keynesian Phillips
curve is the Instrumental Variables or, more generally, the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM). Expectations about future variables are replaced by
their ex-post realizations, and expectational errors are assumed to be uncor-
related with all variables in the information set of agents available at the
time expectations are formed. In other words, expectations are assumed to
be rational.
1There is, however, an ongoing debate in the recent literature about the
appropriateness of the GMM technique. As mentioned by Mavroeidis (2005)
and Rudd and Whelan (2005), GMM estimates may overstate the degree of
forward-looking behavior if the true expectation formation process is non-
rational in the sense that important variables are omitted. In conjunction
with the use of instrument variables that are correlated with future in°ation,
this omission leads to inconsistent parameter estimates that bias upwards
the coe±cient of expected in°ation. Consequently, Mavroeidis (2005) and
Rudd and Whelan (2005) argue that the small role for lagged in°ation in the
HNKPC identi¯ed by Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) (and later by Gal¶ ³ et al. 2001,
2003, 2005) is econometrically unreliable in that they ignore other variables
that may in°uence in°ation.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On a theoretical level we
derive the HNKPC under the assumption that ¯rms may have non-rational
expectations. Available evidence from surveys suggests that in°ation expec-
tations are in many cases biased and ine±cient predictors of future in°ation,
thereby questioning the assumption of rationality (see Roberts, 1997, and the
papers cited there). We extend the theoretical framework developed by Adam
and Padula (2003) by allowing for the existence of both, forward-looking and
backward-looking ¯rms. On an empirical level we follow Roberts (1997) and
Adam and Padula (2003) and use direct measures of in°ation expectations,
instead of imposing rational expectations and estimating the Phillips curve
by GMM. The data source is the Ifo World Economic Survey which quarterly
polls economic experts about their expected future development of in°ation.
The main results are that (i) in comparison with the rational expectations
approach backward-looking behavior turns out to be more relevant for most
countries in our sample and that (ii) the use of survey data for in°ation ex-
pectations yields a positive slope of the Phillips curve when the output gap
is used as a measure for marginal cost. Real unit labor costs seem to be the
driving variable for in°ation only in two of the countries considered in this
study.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the standard
version of the HNKPC that results from a rational expectations approach
and we modify it in a way that accounts for subjective and potentially non-
rational expectations of ¯rms. Section 3 gives an overview of the data. The
main focus is on the presentation of the in°ation expectations from the Ifo
WES, but we also brie°y discuss the variables used as proxies for real mar-
ginal costs. Our estimation results and a comparison with other empirical
work (mainly using the rational expectations approach) are presented in sec-
tion 4. Finally, section 5 summarizes the main results and concludes.
22 The Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve
2.1 Rational Expectations
The version of the HNKPC that is mostly used in the literature has been
introduced by Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) and extended by Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and
L¶ opez-Salido (2001). It is based on Calvo's (1983) staggered price setting
framework in which each ¯rm has a probability 1 ¡ µ of being able to reset
its price in any given period, independently of the time elapsed since the most
recent price adjustment. In contrast to Calvo (1983), however, they assume
that of those ¯rms being able to adjust prices in a given period, there is
only a fraction of ¯rms 1 ¡ ! that sets prices optimally in a forward-looking
manner. The remaining part uses a rule-of-thumb that simply augments last
period's average reset price by the in°ation rate prevailing in that period. It
can then be shown that the HNKPC is given by
¼t = °fEt[¼t+1] + °b¼t¡1 + ¸mct + "t (1)
where ¼t denotes the in°ation rate, E[¢] the rational expectations operator,
and mct the logarithm of real marginal costs, and where the coe±cients can
be expressed in terms of the structural parameters
°f =
¯µ




µ + ![1 ¡ µ(1 ¡ ¯)]
;
¸ =
(1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯µ)
µ + ![1 ¡ µ(1 ¡ ¯)]
:
¯ is the discount factor of the ¯rms' intertemporal maximization problem. An
important assumption underlying the derivation of the structural parameters
was that ¯rms operate under monopolistic competition with a Cobb-Douglas
production technology and constant returns to scale. If returns to scale are
decreasing, Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido (2001) showed that ¸ addition-
ally becomes a function of the labor elasticity of production and the price
elasticity of demand.
This very general formulation of the Phillips curve comprises two special
cases. First, when the discount factor ¯ is restricted to unity, °f + °b = 1,
which implies that in the long-run the Phillips curve is vertical. Second,
when ! = 0 all ¯rms set their prices optimally and the model converges to
the pure forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve (°f = ¯, °b = 0,
¸ = [(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯µ)]=µ).
32.2 Subjective Expectations
As in the previous section we distinguish between two groups of ¯rms: forward-
looking ¯rms which set prices according to an intertemporal optimization
procedure, and backward-looking ¯rms which set prices according to a sim-
ple rule-of-thumb. The main di®erence to the previous section is the way
forward-looking ¯rms form their expectations. Instead of imposing rational
expectations (i.e. all ¯rms form expectations homogenously, using the same
model and the same information set), we allow for subjective expectations
of each single forward-looking ¯rm which may be rational or not and which
may be heterogeneous across ¯rms.
In the following we will derive the HNKPC under the assumption that
¯rms form subjective expectations. We will extend the theoretical frame-
work of Adam and Padula (2003) by explicitly introducing backward-looking
¯rms. In contrast to their paper which describes the price-setting behavior
of ¯rms from the point of view of professional forecasters, we assume that
the source of potential non-rationalities in expectations are the ¯rms them-
selves. This has the advantage that we can continue to distinguish between
two types of ¯rms as in the case of rational expectations. If we had extended
the professional forecasters' approach of Adam and Padula (2003), we would
have faced the problem of ¯nding an economic rationale for the additional
consideration of ¼t¡1 in the Phillips curve. The reason for this is, that profes-
sional forecasters should take into account the existence of backward-looking
¯rms when forming their expectations.
In accordance with the rational expectations approach the starting
point is Calvo's (1983) staggered price setting framework which de¯nes the
log of the aggregate price level pt as
pt = (1 ¡ µ)p
¤
t + µpt¡1; (2)
where p¤
t is the average reset price and 1 ¡ µ the probability that ¯rms reset
prices. The average reset price is a weighted sum of the average price set by
forward-looking ¯rms and the average price set by backward-looking ¯rms
p
¤















where I (J) is the number of forward-looking (backward-looking) ¯rms, !





price set by the backward-looking (forward-looking) ¯rm i. All ¯rms which
set prices in a backward-looking manner, follow an identical rule-of-thumb
4according to which last period's average reset price is simply corrected by












t¡1 + ¼t¡1: (4)
Firms which behave in a forward-looking manner, maximize expected dis-
counted pro¯ts given technology, factor prices and the constraint on price
adjustment (de¯ned by 1 ¡ µ) which results in the following log-linear rule:
p
f;i
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t[¢] denotes the subjective expectations operator of ¯rm i.1 While
individual ¯rms produce di®erentiated products under monopolistic com-
petition, they are all assumed to have the same Cobb-Douglas production
technology and to face demand curves with constant and equal demand elas-
ticities. The crucial problem now is the aggregation of individual prices set by
forward-looking ¯rms. Following Adam and Padula (2003) we assume that
¯rm i forms expectations about other ¯rms' optimum prices and aggregates


























and assuming that the `law of iterated expectations' holds which implies
that agents do not expect that current forecasts of future variables z will be







t [zt+s]] = 0 8 i;h;s > 0; (8)









t+1] ¡ mct ¡ pt); (9)
1Apart from the Fi
t[¢] operator equation (5) is identical with the optimum pricing rule
under rational expectations. For a derivation see Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) and Gal¶ ³, Gertler,







t. In order to get this equation they took the di®er-
ence between equation (6) and (7), replaced p
f;h
t with the ¯rst expression of
equation (5) and applied the law of iterated expectations (see appendix A).
Combining equations (2), (3) and (4) gives a relationship between p
f
t




pt + (µ! ¡ 2! ¡ µ)pt¡1 + !pt¡2
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ !)
; (10)








t[pt+1] + (µ! ¡ 2! ¡ µ)pt + !pt¡1
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ !)
: (11)
Inserting equations (10) and (11) into equation (9) and aggregating over all
subjective expectations, ¹ Ft[¢] = (1=I)
PI
i=1 F i
t[¢], ¯nally gives the HNKPC
based on average subjective expectations (see appendix C),
¼t = °f ¹ Ft[¼t+1] + °b¼t¡1 + ¸mct; (12)
where ¼t = pt ¡ pt¡1. Note that equation (12) is identical with the speci¯-
cation derived under rational expectations, except for the way expectations
are formed.
3 Data Description
3.1 In°ation Expectations from the Ifo World Eco-
nomic Survey
Subjective in°ation expectations are taken from the Ifo World Economic Sur-
vey (WES) which assesses trends in the world economy by polling transna-
tional as well as national organizations worldwide about economic develop-
ments. It is conducted in co-operation of Ifo Institute for Economic Research
and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. The question-
naire of the WES which is distributed every quarter (January, April, July
and October) and which was ¯rst conducted in March 1983 asks participants
to give their assessment of the general economic situation and expectations
regarding important macroeconomic indicators of the country they inhabit.
Currently, the WES asks about 1100 experts in 90 countries.
A question on the expected in°ation rate, which is in the focus of the
present paper, was only included since July 1991. Survey participants are
asked to give their expectations on the in°ation rate by the end of the next six
6months. They indicate UP for an expected rise in the in°ation rate, SAME
for no change in the in°ation rate and DOWN for an expected fall in the
in°ation rate by the end of the next six months. The questionnaire therefore
reveals qualitative information on the participants' expectations. In Henzel
and WollmershÄ auser (2006) we presented a new methodology for the quan-
ti¯cation of qualitative survey data. Traditional conversion methods, such as
the Carlson and Parkin (1975) method or the time-varying parameters model
of Seitz (1988), require very restrictive assumptions concerning the expecta-
tions formation process of survey respondents. Above all, the unbiasedness of
expectations, which is a necessary condition for rationality, is imposed. Our
approach avoids this assumption. The novelty was the way the boundaries
inside of which survey respondents expect the variable under consideration
to remain unchanged are determined. Instead of deriving these boundaries
from the statistical properties of the reference time-series (which necessitates
the unbiasedness assumption), we directly queried them from survey respon-
dents by a special question in the Ifo WES. The new methodology was then
applied to expectations about the future development of in°ation obtained
from the Ifo WES.
For Germany, France, Italy, the Euro zone2, the UK and the US the
converted in°ation expectations and the actual in°ation rate are shown in
¯gure 1. In°ation rates are taken from the OECD database, except for Euro
zone in°ation which was taken from Eurostat. Note that there are two out-
liers in the expectations time-series, namely in France (third quarter of 2000)
and in Italy (second quarter of 1996), for which we controlled in our empirical
analysis below by adding a dummy variable to the regression. The occur-
rence of these outliers is an unavoidable shortcoming of all conversion meth-
ods, when at a given point in time the assumption of normally distributed
survey responses is violated.3 In°ation expectations from the Ifo WES are
6-months-ahead in°ation expectations which are queried every three months
in the ¯rst two weeks of January, April, July and October. In Henzel and
WollmershÄ auser (2006) we showed that the information set that is available
to the survey respondents at the time they ¯ll in the questionnaire is the
past quarter (that is the ¯rst quarter for the questionnaires returned at the
beginning of April, the second quarter for the questionnaires returned at the
2Euro zone in°ation expectations have been calculated as a weighted sum of the re-
sponses for the individual member countries. The weights are the country weights used by
Eurostat to calculate the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices for the Euro zone. See
Henzel and WollmershÄ auser (2006) for further details.
3In the case of France, for example, in the October 2000 survey 13 out of 21 respondents
indicated UP and 7 indicated DOWN. The problem was that only 1 respondent expected
in°ation to remain the same, which is a clear violation of the normality assumption.
7beginning of July, and so on). Thus, the April survey produces in°ation
expectations ¹ Ft¼t+2, where t refers to the ¯rst quarter and t+2 to the third
quarter. As in a quarterly Phillips curve model the required expectation's
horizon should be a quarter of a year, it would be more convenient to use
the Ifo WES 6-months-ahead in°ation expectations together with semian-
nual data. In order to see whether the frequency of the data matters for
the empirical results, we ran regressions using both, quarterly and semian-
nual data. As the estimated coe±cients were almost identical, we decided to
present only the results of the regressions that were obtained using quarterly
data. By using the 6-months-ahead in°ation expectations as proxies for 3-
month expectations we implicitly assumed that forecaster's expectations are
the same for each of the two upcoming 3-month periods (see also Roberts,
1997, on this point).
As most of the countries considered in this paper belonged to the Eu-
ropean Monetary System, the data starts in the ¯rst quarter of 1993 in order
to exclude the crisis which took place in September 1992. Compared to most
other empirical Phillips curve studies this rather short estimation period is
a novelty (see table 11 for a summary of other papers).4
Using survey data for in°ation expectations instead of imposing ratio-
nal expectations when estimating a Phillips curve relationship should only
produce di®erent results, if survey expectations are not being formed ratio-
nally. The reason why we are questioning the rationality of survey expecta-
tions is due to the mixed evidence reported in the literature. Many papers
that have examined survey measures of in°ation expectations have concluded
that these expectations are not rational in the sense of Muth (1961) (see for
example Roberts, 1997, and the papers cited there).
A necessary condition for rational expectations is the unbiasedness of
expectations. In order to ¯nd out whether Ifo WES expectations are unbiased
predictors of future in°ation we regressed the forecast error (de¯ned as ¼t ¡
¹ Ft¡2¼t) on a constant c and tested whether it is signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero. Table (1) reveals that in the Euro zone, France and Germany in°ation
expectations were unbiased during the period 1993:1 to 2004:2. By contrast,
in the UK, the US and Italy expectations do not ful¯ll the necessary condition
for rationality.5 From the negative sign of the constant we can conclude that
expectations were biased upwards throughout the period of disin°ation in
4As was already mentioned in the introduction, the standard estimation technique in
these papers is GMM. However, it is well known that GMM estimates su®er from a serious
small-sample bias, which explains why most samples start in 1970 or earlier.
5Using the Livingston Survey of Professional Forecasters (which queries quantitative
in°ation expectations) Adam and Padula (2003) also ¯nd that expectations in the US
were biased during the nineties.





































































Figure 1: Actual (solid line) and expected (dashed line) in°ation
9the beginning of the 1990s.














LM(2) 0.82 0.77 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00
LM(4) 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.01
Note: We set a dummy variable to control for the outliers in France (2000:2) and
Italy (1996:1) which are due to the conversion of in°ation expectations from
qualitative into quantitative data. The p-values, which have been calculated
using Newey-West standard errors to correct for overlapping forecast errors,
are reported in brackets. The last two rows report p-values for an LM test for
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to the second and fourth lag.
Table 1: Unbiasedness of expectations
A further necessary condition for rational expectations is the e±ciency
of expectations which implies that no piece of information known at time t¡2
or earlier can be used to explain the forecast error. A ¯rst indication for the
ine±ciency of expectations is given by the p-values of the serial correlation
LM-test in table 1, which indicate that { except for Italy and France { the
residuals are not free of autocorrelation.6 Autocorrelation in the forecast
error implies that a shock to the in°ation rate or to some other economic
variable was not taken into account when the in°ation forecast was made
and that the same mistake was repeated in subsequent periods. In other
words, e±ciency of expectations requires that the forecast could not have
been improved by adding additional information. In order to test for this, the
forecast error is regressed on a number of exogenous variables that are known
at time t¡2 and that are possibly relevant when forecasting in°ation.7 Table
6As the forecast horizon does not correspond to the frequency of the survey, shocks to
the in°ation rate can not be taken into account until the second period after the forecast
and the same error may be repeated again. Thus, autocorrelation of order one in the error
constitutes no irrationality.
7Our proceeding basically follows Roberts (1997) who introduced as potentially omitted
variables the output gap as a measure of overall economic activity (see section 3.2 for a
de¯nition), the in°ation rate to capture the persistence of in°ation, and the three-month
interest rate as an indicator for the stance of monetary policy. Since unit root tests
indicated that the interest rates are non-stationary, we used ¯rst di®erences. In addition
to that, we included real unit labor costs (see section 3.2 for a de¯nition) and lagged terms
of the forecast error. The explanatory power of each group of variables (which comprises
four lags of the variable under consideration) was tested separately. The forecast error,
real unit labor cost and the output gap enter the regression only from t¡3 on, for reasons
of overlapping forecast errors and because we assume a publication lag of one quarter.
102 reports p-values related to Â2-statistics of a Wald test of the null hypothesis
that the coe±cients on the aforementioned lags of these regressors are jointly
equal to zero. In the Euro zone, France, Germany, Italy and the UK lagged
values of the forecast error can explain the movement of the forecast error
at the ¯ve percent level, which is a hint that survey respondents seem to
be sluggish when correcting their expectations after having recognized the
last forecast error. Also past in°ation rates are of explanatory use in all
countries. This means that respondents underestimate the inertia of the
in°ation rate. In none of the countries except France the output gap has
a signi¯cant in°uence, indicating that the respondents seem to take it into
account when forming their expectations. By contrast, real unit labor costs
seem to be omitted in the Euro zone, France, and the US. The three-month
interest rate helps explain the forecast error in Germany, Italy, UK and the
US.8
Country Error In°ation Output gap RULC 3M Rate
lags 3 to 6 lags 2 to 5 lags 3 to 6 lags 3 to 6 lags 2 to 5
Euro zone 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.17
France 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43
Germany 0.03 0.01 0.60 0.07 0.00
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.02
UK 0.04 0.00 0.35 0.22 0.00
US 0.86 0.00 0.21 0.03 0.04
Note: Dummy variables are set like before. The table shows p-values for a het-
eroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Wald-test on joint signi¯cance
of each group of lagged variables (Error = forecast error, RULC = real unit labor
cost, 3M Rate = three-month nominal interest rate).
Table 2: E±ciency tests
3.2 Measures for Real Marginal Costs
There has been an extensive discussion in the literature about the correct
proxy for real marginal costs (see for example Gal¶ ³ and Gertler, 1999, Gal¶ ³,
Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido, 2001 and Sbordone, 2005). There are basically
two candidates that are considered: real unit labor costs and the output gap.
8Roberts (1997) and the studies cited there also ¯nd no support of the e±ciency hy-
pothesis for the US. Adam and Padula (2003) come to the same conclusion. For the Euro
zone Forsells and Kenny (2002) who investigated qualitative in°ation expectations from
the European Commission's Consumer Survey also ¯nd that expectation were not e±cient
during the nineties.
11The hypothesis that real unit labor costs is a good proxy for real marginal
costs can be justi¯ed by the assumption that the production technology is
Cobb-Douglas and that capital is constant over time. Real marginal costs







where ® is the labor elasticity of production, Wt the nominal wage rate, Nt
employment, Pt the price level, and Yt aggregate output. The second term
on the right-hand-side is typically referred to as the labor income share or
real unit labor costs. Log-linearizing equation (13) around the steady state
gives
mct = wt + nt ¡ pt ¡ yt (14)
where lower case-letters denote the percentage deviation of a variable around
its steady state. Thus, under the assumption that ® is constant over time,
equation (14) shows that real marginal costs and real unit labor costs move
in a one-to-one relation around their steady state.
While real unit labor costs are a direct measure of a ¯rm's real marginal
costs, it can be shown that under certain conditions the output gap is a close
proxy. We will not go into the details of the derivation of this relationship
because it has been well documented in standard textbooks on monetary
economics (see for example Walsh, 2003, chapter 5.4). The idea is that
after combining the households' labor supply decision (real wage equals the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor) with the ¯rms'
price-setting condition (price equals a mark-up over nominal marginal costs),
an expression for the output level under both °exible and rigid prices can be
derived. Under the assumption that labor market frictions exist but do not
vary over time, real marginal costs are then a linear function of the output
gap xt
mct = (¾ + ´)(yt ¡ y
flex
t ) = (¾ + ´)xt (15)
where 1=¾ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, ´
the elasticity of marginal disutility with respect to labor supply, and y
flex
t the
log of the level of output that would prevail if prices were perfectly °exible
(i.e. µ = 0). The HNKPC then becomes
¼t = °f ¹ Ft[¼t+1] + °b¼t¡1 + ¸
0xt + "t (16)
where ¸0 = ¸(¾ + ´).
In our empirical analysis we consider both types of measures for real
marginal costs. Speci¯cally we use












































































Figure 2: GAP (dashed line) and RULC (continuous line)
13² the deviation of the logarithm of CPI-de°ated unit labor costs (of the
total economy)9 from a linear trend (over the period 1990:1-2004:3):
RULC;
² and the OECD output gap (as published in the OECD Economic Out-
look, Vol. 2004/2, No. 76):10 GAP.




We begin by presenting estimates for the pure forward-looking New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve which can be derived as a special case from the HNKPC
by setting ! = 0 (see table 3). In the pure forward-looking case the esti-
mated parameter of in°ation expectations is equal to the discount factor ¯.
Irrespective of the model speci¯cation the ¯'s are all statistically signi¯cant
and in the neighborhood of one. For all countries except for the UK and
the US (and Italy at the 10% level), Wald tests can not reject the null hy-
pothesis that ¯ equals one. However, the estimated values of ¯ are smaller
than one in those countries. Interestingly, Italy, the UK and the US are the
three countries for which the Ifo WES in°ation expectations turned out to
be biased (see section 3.1). Concerning the slope coe±cient ¸ our results are
to some extent in line with those obtained by Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido
(2001) who used a rational expectations-GMM approach. While some of the
estimated ¸'s of the RULC model (Euro zone, France and Germany) are
positive and signi¯cant, the rest of the countries show no signi¯cant e®ect.
The ¸ of the output gap model is positive and signi¯cant only for the UK.
For all other countries (except for France) it turns out to be negative, but
the in°uence on in°ation is insigni¯cant. These results are perfectly in line
with the cross correlations between in°ation and RULC on the one hand,
and in°ation and the output gap on the other hand (see ¯gure 3). For k = 0
(that is, contemporaneous correlation) ¸ is positive and signi¯cant only in
9Unit labor costs of the total economy are taken from the OECD database. Italian unit
labor costs are only available for the business sector (which is de¯ned as total economy
minus public sector).
10Alternative measures of the output gap, such as a Hodrick-Prescott-¯ltered GDP series
or the rate of capacity utilization, gave qualitatively similar results and are available from
the authors upon request.
14those cases where correlations in ¯gure 2 are positive as well. In many cases,
however, the estimations of the pure forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips
curve produce residuals which are strongly auto-correlated which indicates
that some important explanatory variables are missing.
RULC GAP























































Notes: Numbers in brackets are p-values which were calculated using HAC
Newey-West standard errors. For France and Italy we set a dummy variable
in 2000:2 and 1996:1, respectively (see section 3.1). For the test on ¯ = 1
we show p-values that are the result of a HAC Wald-test.
Table 3: Estimation results for the forward-looking Phillips curve
We therefore turn to the estimation of the HNKPC which explicitly
allows lagged in°ation to have additional explanatory power for current in-
°ation. Table 4 reveals that in all of our estimations of the HNKPC the
coe±cients for both subjective in°ation expectations and lagged in°ation are
positive and signi¯cant. For most countries the point estimates of °b turn
out to be higher in the output gap model, whereas the °f's are somewhat
lower. Looking at the individual countries, we can distinguish between three
groups. In Germany and Italy the degree of backwardness is relatively high.
Irrespective of the measure for marginal costs, °b exceeds °f. In France the
opposite is true. The estimated °f's are higher than the °b's, implying that
French ¯rms are more forward-looking than their German or Italian competi-
tors. In the Euro zone as a whole, the US and { to some extent { the UK
optimizing ¯rms and rule-of-thumb price setters are more or less balanced.
The sign and signi¯cance of the measure for real marginal costs crucially
depend on the empirical speci¯cation of the HNKPC and di®er from the
results obtained from the estimation of the purely forward-looking Phillips

































Note: The correlation coe±cient is depicted on the vertical axis, and k on the horizontal
axis.
Figure 3: Cross correlograms
explanatory variable for in°ation in France, Italy and { as in the forward-
looking version { the UK, which is astonishing, given the low and mostly
negative contemporaneous correlation between the output gap and in°ation
(see ¯gure 3). From an econometric point of view the signi¯cant output
gap coe±cients can be explained by the high correlation of the output gap
with the unexplained part of a regression of in°ation on lagged and expected
in°ation. When RULC are used as a measure for marginal costs the results
are more or less in line with those for the purely forward-looking Phillips
curve. The ¸'s for the Euro zone and France remain positive and signi¯cant
whereas ¸ for Germany becomes insigni¯cant. Our results indicate that the
impact of marginal cost on in°ation in the US is best captured by RULC
16as we ¯nd a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on in°ation. These results are
roughly in line with the cross correlations we present in the upper part of
¯gure 3.
A necessary condition for the dynamic process to be stable is that
the sum of °f and °b does not exceed one. To be sure that the process is
not exploding, we also estimate a restricted version of the HNKPC where
°f +°b = 1. Table 5 shows that the estimates of °f are still highly signi¯cant
in every country. For the Euro zone, France, Germany, Italy and the UK the
imposed restriction leaves the estimates of both, °f and ¸=¸0 more or less
unchanged. In the US, by contrast, °f becomes signi¯cantly smaller than
in the unrestricted estimation. Moreover, the impact of RULC on in°ation
turns out to become insigni¯cant, whereas the output gap yields positive and
signi¯cant estimates now. A further hint that a restricted regression may not
be appropriate in the case of the US comes from a Wald test applied to the
unrestricted regression which rejects the restriction °f + °b = 1 at the 1%
level.
4.2 Robustness of the Estimates
In this section we want to investigate whether our estimates from tables 3 to
5 are robust with respect to OLS assumptions. One problem that may arise
is that the estimations in the last section su®er from endogeneity of the re-
gressors. In particular we may suspect that the expectational variable ¹ Ft¼t+2
is caused by the current in°ation rate, a problem which is often addressed as
simultaneity. Moreover, the OLS estimations of the HNKPC may su®er from
autocorrelation in the residuals. In this case the lagged endogenous variable
¼t¡1 may be correlated with the error term of the regression equation. How-
ever, a lagged endogenous variable is present only in the hybrid version of the
Phillips Curve. In a purely forward looking framework it should be su±cient
to perform a Newey-West adjustment of the regression standard errors for a
correct inference in the presence of autocorrelated residuals.
We check the robustness of OLS estimates by estimating the hybrid
and the forward-looking version again by using instrumental variables meth-
ods. Speci¯cally, we run a two-stage least squares (TSLS) regression where
we instrument for ¹ Ft¼t+2 when estimating both types of Phillips curves. In
the hybrid version we additionally instrument for ¼t¡1, even though autocor-
relation in the residuals arises mainly when estimating the purely forward-
looking Phillips curve. We also do a Newey-West adjustment of the variance-
covariance matrices of the estimators to obtain heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation robust standard errors.
We consider up to four lagged terms as instruments of ¹ Ft¼t+2 as they
17RULC GAP









































































Notes: See table 3.
Table 4: Estimation results for the hybrid Phillips curve
RULC GAP

















































Notes: See table 3.
Table 5: Estimation results for the hybrid Phillips curve when °f + °b = 1
18should be exogenous to ¼t. The reason is that ¼t is not part of the information
set at time t¡1. We also use four lags of either RULC or GAP as instruments
as these are the driving variables in the in°ation process. Four lags should
be su±cient to account for the dynamics in the economy.
In order to test whether these instrumental variable estimations su®er
from weak instruments we present, in a ¯rst step, the R2 of the ¯rst stage
regressions as well as the partial R2 as proposed by Shea (1997). The latter
measures the explanatory power of the instruments with respect to the por-
tion of the endogenous explanatory variable that is orthogonal to the other
explanatory variables of the estimation equation. Having argued before that
instruments are exogenous, we also ¯nd that they can explain the variation
in the endogenous explanatory variables as ¯rst-stage R2s as well as partial
R2s are reasonably high (see table 6).
Euro France Ger Italy UK US
zone -many
RULC
¹ Ft¼t+2 1st stage R2 0.71 0.73 0.45 0.84 0.60 0.51
part. R2 0.39 0.23 0.21 0.32 0.33 0.12
¼t¡1 1st stage R2 0.93 0.86 0.73 0.64 0.84 0.86
part. R2 0.39 0.23 0.21 0.30 0.35 0.12
GAP
¹ Ft¼t+2 1st stage R2 0.75 0.68 0.47 0.84 0.59 0.59
part. R2 0.32 0.21 0.29 0.36 0.33 0.37
¼t¡1 1st stage R2 0.91 0.82 0.59 0.59 0.88 0.85
part. R2 0.25 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.37 0.31
Table 6: First stage R2 and partial R2
In a second step we present the results of the TSLS regressions in tables
7 to 9. Provided that the instruments are valid, it is possible to test whether
one of the regressors is endogenous. The OLS estimator is consistent and
e±cient only if there is no endogenous regressor. The TSLS estimator is not
e±cient, but consistent even in the case of endogeneity. Hausman (1978)
proposed a test which compares the coe±cient vectors ^ ¯IV and ^ ¯OLS from
both regressions.11 If they are not systematically di®erent, one should rely
on the results of the OLS regression and conclude that there is no problem of
11The test statistic is calculated as H = (^ ¯IV ¡ ^ ¯OLS)0(^ V (^ ¯IV ) ¡ ^ V (^ ¯OLS))¡1(^ ¯IV ¡
^ ¯OLS), where ^ V is the variance-covariance matrix. It has a Â2 distribution with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of estimated coe±cients.
19endogenous regressors.12 In tables 7 to 9 we show the p-values for a Hausman
test (H0 : ^ ¯OLS is consistent and e±cient) in the columns which are labeled
with H.
RULC GAP























































Notes: See table 3.
Table 7: IV (TSLS) estimation results for the forward-looking Phillips curve
Comparing the results in table 7 with those in table 3 shows that the
estimated coe±cients do not change substantially. Only in Germany the
¯'s are somewhat higher, whereas in France the TSLS estimation leads to
lower coe±cients. In addition, the (in)signi¯cant OLS estimates for ¸ all
remain (in)signi¯cant when applying the TSLS procedure. Nevertheless, we
calculate test statistics for the Hausman test which are signi¯cant at the 5%
level in three (two) cases when we use GAP (RULC) as a measure for real
marginal costs. This may be due to the fact that we did apply the test to
OLS and TSLS estimates that were not adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. As the latter is apparently a problem when estimating the
purely forward-looking Phillips curve, also the application of the Hausman
test may be problematic here because estimated variance-covariance matrices
^ V may not be correct.
However, in case of the HNKPC the test indicates that we can rely
on the OLS estimates. Turning to table 8, the TSLS estimates are close
to those obtained in table 4. This fact is re°ected by the test statistic H
12Note that the distribution of the test statistic is only known for variance-covariance
matrices of estimators that have not been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocor-
relation. Therefore, we use the unadjusted variance-covariance matrices to calculate the
test statistic. However, the p-values for the signi¯cance of the estimated parameters were
calculated using Newey-West adjustment of the standard errors.
20RULC GAP















































































Notes: See table 3.
Table 8: IV (TSLS) estimation results for the hybrid Phillips curve
RULC GAP























































Notes: See table 3.
Table 9: IV (TSLS) estimation results for the hybrid Phillips curve when
°f + °b = 1
21being insigni¯cant. To some extent, France and Germany are an exception
as French ¯rms turn out to be even more forward-looking compared to the
OLS estimates, while German ¯rms are now highly backward-looking with °f
even becoming insigni¯cant. Nevertheless, the Hausman test indicates that
we should rely on the OLS estimates also in these cases. Similar results are
obtained in table 9 where we estimated the restricted HNKPC with TSLS.
Here, the US turns out to be more backward-looking compared to OLS results
but this may again only re°ect the fact that the restriction we set on the
coe±cients are not valid here. In general the TSLS estimates together with
the Hausman test results indicate that the OLS procedure is superior to
TSLS and yields reliable estimates for the Phillips curve.
4.3 Stability
A further issue that needs to be addressed is whether the estimated coef-
¯cients of the Phillips curve are stable over time. Figures 4 and 5 show
the results of a CUSUM of squares test at the 1% level. For both, the
purely forward-looking Phillips curves and the HNKPC, the cumulated sum
of squares of recursive residuals lie within the signi¯cance lines for Germany,
Italy, the UK and the US, implying that the regression relationship is con-
stant over time, irrespective of the chosen measure for real marginal cost.
For the other countries, the cumulated sum of squares of recursive residuals
temporarily crosses the signi¯cance lines, but then stays inside the thresholds
again.




















































































Figure 4: CUSUM of squares of the forward-looking Phillips curve: RULC
(upper panel) and GAP (lower panel).




















































































Figure 5: CUSUM of squares of HNKPC: RULC (upper panel) and GAP
(lower panel).
4.4 Summary of the Results and Comparison with other
Studies
In this section we want to compare our results with those obtained in other
empirical studies. The direct use of measures for in°ation expectations which
naturally avoids any assumptions on the expectations formation process is
much less popular. We only found ¯ve studies using either survey data or
OECD forecasts for expectations which are summarized in table 10. The
great majority of empirical work on the New Keynesian Phillips curve applies
the rational expectations approach. Table 11 presents some of the most recent
papers.
A great part of the discussion in most of the empirical work is concerned
with the question about the correct proxy variable for real marginal costs.
For the US Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999), Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido (2001)
and Sbordone (2005) show that real unit labor costs empirically perform
much better than the output gap. Above all, they ¯nd that slope of the
Phillips curve becomes signi¯cantly negative. A notable exception is the
paper of Jondeau and LeBihan (2006) who come to the conclusion that the
output gap model is the preferred speci¯cation in Germany, Italy and the
Euro zone. When survey data are used to measure in°ation expectations,
the results in favor of the output gap are more promising. Our paper shows
that the slope of the Phillips curve is always positive and even signi¯cant in
France, Italy and the UK. This ¯nding is in line with all other survey data








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27The second interesting result of our paper is that, except for France, the
degree of forward-looking behavior is found to be lower when using survey
data instead of imposing rational expectations. And this ¯nding is qualita-
tively con¯rmed by the other survey data studies. In table 12 we calculated
averages of the estimates of °f that were presented in tables 10 and 11.
Germany is a very striking example. While studies using the rational ex-
pectations approach ¯nd an average coe±cient for °f of 0.70, our estimates
are much lower, with an average value of 0.26. Reckwerth (1997) who uses
another source for German in°ation expectations also ¯nds estimates for °f
which are smaller than under the rational expectations approach. The re-
sults for the US point into the same direction. While the average value for
°f under rational expectations is 0.59, our regressions returned an average
value of 0.40. Again, this tendency of a lower degree of forwardness when
survey data is used, is con¯rmed by other studies.
There are three possible explanations for the di®erences in the esti-
mated coe±cients °f and °b. First, our sample only starts at the beginning
of the 1990s whereas most of the other studies begin in 1960 or 1970. Since
the price setting behavior of ¯rms depends to a large extent on expectations
about future in°ation, the monetary policy regime that is in force plays a
crucial role for the estimated behavioral parameters. Most of the countries
in our sample, however, underwent one or even more signi¯cant changes in
their monetary policy strategy so that lower estimates for °f for the period
1993 to present cannot be excluded from the GMM results. Unfortunately,
stability of the results is rarely discussed in these papers.
Second, non-rationalities which are incorporated in survey expectations
may matter for the price-setting process of ¯rms. In section 3.1 we showed
that in°ation expectations of the Ifo WES are ine±cient and in some cases
even biased predictors of future in°ation. This is in clear contrast to the
assumption made when GMM is used as estimation technique. An indication
in favor of this explanation are the results of studies using survey data listed
in table 10. Their samples range from the 1960s to 1999 or even longer which
is more or less similar to the time span covered by most rational expectations
studies, and their average point estimates for °f are close to ours. A possible
explanation is put forward by Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999), Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and
L¶ opez-Salido (2005) and also Rudd and Whelan (2005) who argue that GMM
estimates for °f may be biased upwards if important variables are omitted
from the model so that the error term in the econometric model contains
information about future in°ation. Rudd and Whelan (2005) even come to
the conclusion that the purely forward-looking model cannot characterize
in°ation dynamics. Our estimations are robust to non-rationalities as they
do not rely on the orthogonality of the expectational error and the set of

































Note: The values in parentheses refer to the standard deviation of the point estimates.
Table 12: Summary of estimates for °f
instruments. We take our estimates as evidence of the presence of a forward-
looking component in in°ation dynamics. Although its importance varies
between the countries that we are considering, it clearly remains signi¯cant.
Third, in order to be able to apply subjective in°ation expectations to
our theoretical framework described in section 2.2 we had to assume that
the survey responses are a representative subset of the expectations of all
¯rms. However, this assumption has recently become subject to criticism.
Nunes (2005), for example, argues that ¯rms are likely to have a higher
degree of rationality than survey respondents since the latter must predict
the aggregate evolution of a basket of prices without any speci¯c knowledge
of each price determinant. From this follows that the observed deviation of
survey data from rational expectations should not be taken as an argument
against the rational expectations approach.
One way to check whether the ¯rst or the second explanation is relevant
is to apply the GMM approach to a shorter sample. Starting in 1993 instead
of 1960 or 1970 would provide some evidence on the stability of the structural
parameters. The problem, however, is that GMM has very poor small sample
properties, meaning that estimators are often found to be biased, widely
dispersed and sensitive to the normalization of the orthogonality conditions
as well as to the choice of the instruments (see for example Fuhrer, Moore,
and Schuh (1995) for a recent paper on this issue).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we provided evidence for the ¯t of the hybrid New Keynesian
Phillips curve for selected Euro zone countries, the US and the UK. Instead
of imposing rational expectations and estimating the Phillips curve by the
Generalized Method of Moments, we followed Roberts (1997) and Adam and
29Padula (2003) and used direct measures of in°ation expectations from the
Ifo World Economic Survey.
Our main ¯ndings are that in comparison with the rational expectations
approach backward-looking behavior is more relevant for most countries in
our sample and that the use of survey data for in°ation expectations yields a
positive slope of the Phillips curve. The signi¯cance of the respective measure
for marginal cost and, hence, the preferred measure, however, depends on the
country considered. There is no case where marginal cost has a signi¯cantly
negative e®ect on in°ation. On the whole, using the output gap as a measure
for marginal cost leads to an upward sloping New Keynesian Phillips curve
which is consistent with theory.
One explanation for these results is that non-rationalities which are in-
corporated in survey expectations may matter for the price-setting process of
¯rms. If we are correct in using a survey among economic experts for approx-
imating ¯rms' expectations, such an explanation would have an important
impact on the policy conclusions that are typically drawn on the basis of
models where agents are assumed to form expectations rationally. Some ¯rst
attempts to model deviations from perfectly rational expectations have been
developed by Mankiw and Reis (2002). In their sticky-information model
they impose a constraint on the information that people use when forming
expectations. They assume that in each period there is a ¯xed probability
that a person updates his information set; otherwise he continues to set prices
on outdated information. In Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2003) they provide a
normative monetary policy analysis that accounts for these deviations from
rationality. And their central conclusion is that under such a setting the cen-
tral bank should target the price level rather than the in°ation rate. Thus,
in future work it would be interesting to investigate in more detail how the
private sector actually forms in°ation expectations.
30Appendix
A Derivation of Equation (9)



























































































t+1] ¡ mct ¡ pt):
B Derivation of Equation (10)
Equation (10) can be derived by aggregating equation (3) to
p
¤





solving the resulting expression for p
f
t and replacing pb






t¡1 + pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2)
1 ¡ !
:
Next, solve equation (2) for p¤
t and replace it in the preceding expression.




pt + (µ! ¡ 2! ¡ µ)pt¡1 + !pt¡2
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ !)
:
31C Derivation of Equation (12)
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An alternative expression for F i
t[¼
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t+1] can de derived by subtracting equation







t[¼t+1] + (µ! ¡ 2! ¡ µ)¼t + !¼t¡1
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ !)
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¹ Ft[¼t+1] + (µ! ¡ 2! ¡ µ)¼t + !¼t¡1
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ !)
:
Equating both expressions for ¹ Ft[¼
f
t+1] and solving for ¼t ¯nally results in
equation (12):








µ + ![1 ¡ µ(1 ¡ ¯)]
;
¸ =
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µ + ![1 ¡ µ(1 ¡ ¯)]
:
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